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First the UK, now Greece   
 
‘NOVA’: the First DTV Package 
 
In December 1999 in Greece, pay-TV company Net Med Hellas, a subsidiary of 
Multichoice, launched the digital satellite package Nova within the framework of Law 
2644 from 1998. Nova had commenced transmissions experimentally in July 1999, but 
obtained the official licence to provide digital pay-TV services on the 20
th
 of December 
of that year. Nova’s original bouquet included the popular movie channels FILMNET 
and FILMSAT, which broadcast new movies from abroad, the Greek kids channel KTV, 
the satellite channels BBC WORLD, DISCOVERY, CARTOON NETWORK and CNN, 
and the sports channel SUPERSPORT, which broadcasts sport events from Greece and 
abroad. Its main attraction was the live coverage of the football and basketball matches of 
the respective Greek leagues.  
 
Despite a relatively rich programming offer Nova only managed to attract 80,000 
subscribers in end August 2002. This could be attributed to several reasons. First, the 
small size of the Greek market (around 3 million TV households) was a significant 
barrier to the creation of a large subscriber base. Earlier predictions of 200-300,000 
subscribers in the first two years of operation did not materialise. The offering of sports, 
movies and children’s programming was not enough to convince Greeks to subscribe to 
the service. A second significant obstacle to digital Pay-TV market development was the 
cost of purchasing the necessary reception equipment (i.e. the set-top box and the satellite 
dish) as well as the monthly subscription fee. The Greek population has, on average, 
relatively low spending power. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head is on average 
just over 4 million Greek Drachmas or 4,500 Euro (around £7.000). By contrast, GDP in 
Britain is around £12.000. It was therefore highly unlikely that a large number of Greek 
consumers would put down a one-off fee of around 150,000 Greek drachmas (450 Euro) 
to purchase a set-top-box and satellite dish and then spend roughly 50 Euro for a monthly 
subscription to access services from Nova. 
 
Third, the limited production capacity by national/local audio-visual Greek producers 
would most certainly hamper the operators’ ability to offer a great deal of high quality 
domestic programming. It then seemed logical for Nova to focus on acquiring foreign 
programming. This, however, incurred financial problems, as the cost of acquiring 
popular programmes has risen dramatically in recent years. In addition, audience ratings 
show that Greek viewers favour mostly domestic rather than foreign programming. A 
fourth factor that prevented take-up of digital pay-TV services was the abundance of free-
to-air terrestrial channels. Greek viewers have access to a number of commercial 
channels with national coverage, the most popular of which are Antenna TV, Mega TV, 
Alpha TV and Star Channel. In addition, there is a wide availability of satellite channels, 
which are offered free of charge. Public service broadcaster ERT broadcasts for free 
popular foreign channels such as CNN, MTV and BBC WORLD. The right of free 
reception of satellite TV in Greece is guaranteed by the Greek legislation, which 
complies with the respective provisions of the European Union and the European 
Council. Viewers may have access to any satellite TV programme that can be picked up 
by their receivers. 
 
‘ADS’: A Competing DTV Platform 
 
Considering all the above facts, it came as no surprise that Nova failed to create a large 
subscriber base and thus generate profits in its first three years of operation. The real 
shock however came when a competing digital platform announced its intention to enter 
an already saturated market in which viewers could choose between many different 
channels, terrestrial or satellite, without having to pay extra. In early 2001 Alpha Digital 
Synthesis S.A. (ADS) launched its own digital satellite TV service. The platform’s main 
shareholders were entrepreneur Mr Tsotsoros with 45% stake, a consortium led by Mr 
Kontominas with 40% stake and Onassis Foundation, respresented by its President Mr 
Papadimitriou, with 15% stake. ADS had obtained the licence to offer digital television 
subscription services from the National Radio-Television Council in June 2000.  
 
When ADS entered the market it immediately acquired the rights to broadcast live the 
home football matches of ten out of sixteen teams competing in the Greek league for two 
years. The company’s shareholders thought of putting down the astronomical, for the 
Greek reality at least, fee of 25bn Greek drachmas (around 72m Euros) to persuade Greek 
football clubs to migrate from Nova to ADS. As a comparison, in 1996 Nova (through 
NetMed) had put down the fee of 15bn drachmas (44m Euros) to broadcast live the 
matches of all football clubs of the Greek league for five years. When the contract ended 
in 2001, the football clubs decided to sell their TV rights individually and not collectively 
as they did in the past. ADS saw the opportunity of acquiring those rights and build up a 
large subscriber base by stealing some of Nova’s subscribers and by attracting new ones.  
 
The problem was that the company overpaid for those rights, in the same way as 
ITVdigital did in Britain. It paid more than 70m Euros in total for the live broadcast of the 
home matches of just 10 out of 16 Greek football clubs competing in the Greek league. 
Since the early days of its operation there has been speculation that the company would 
not survive for a number of reasons. First, according to Ernst & Young, the company’s 
stock value was 1.4bn drachmas (around 10m Euros). It was highly unlikely that a 
company valued at just 10m Euros could raise 72m Euros to honour the contracts it had 
signed with the football clubs. Second, the 40,000 subscribers it managed to attract by 
mid-June 2002 were not enough to cover the initial investment and running costs. It 
needed ten times that number for a possible break-even. As stated above though, the 
Greek television market is too small and too saturated to support extra pay-TV channels. 
The acquisition of exclusive rights to broadcast live football matches was not enough for 
a building up of a large subscriber base. Football might be a national obsession but there 
is a limit on how much football funs are prepared to pay to watch their favourite teams. 
Third, the company used the Videoguard decoder for unscrambling of the TV signal, 
which was not compatible with that used by Nova subscribers (Irdeto). As a result, Greek 
viewers had to purchase two different decoders at around 200 Euros each to be able to 
watch the matches of all (sixteen) football clubs of the Greek league as well as other 
services on offer. The cost factor was thus a significant one for the low take-up of DTV 
services. 
 
On 11 September 2002 ADS announced that it would close down due to economic 
difficulties. A few days later Nova (through NetMed) announced that, subject to Greek 
competition Committee and other necessary approvals, agreement had been reached for 
Fidelity Management S.A., a company ultimately owned by affiliates of the shareholders 
of ADS, to take up a 22% interest in NetMed. Put it another way, the agreement means 
that Nova will remain as a sole DTV platform in operation, whereas ADS shareholders 
will have a 22% stake in the company. ADS’s subscribers will be given the option to 
migrate to Nova if they so wish without having to pay extra. This is because ADS will 
give its subscribers the necessary software to be able to access Nova’s services.   
 
Effects on Clubs 
 
The collapse of ADS is expected to have a devastating effect for Greek football clubs, 
particularly those ten teams which had signed contracts with ADS for televising their 
home matches. The three popular Athens-based clubs of “Olympiakos”, “AEK” and 
“Panathinaikos” were to receive 5bn Greek drachmas (15m Euro), 3.5bn drachmas 
(10.5m Euro) and 2.8bn drachmas (8m Euro) respectively in the next two years. The 
football club of “PAOK”, based in Thessalonika, Northern Greece, was to receive 2bn 
drachmas (6m Euro), while the other two clubs of “Iraklis” and “Aris”, also based in 
Thessalonika, agreed a sum of 1.2bn drachmas (3.5m Euro) each for two years. The other 
four less popular clubs that signed contracts with ADS (“Xanthi”, “Panionios”, Giannina” 
and “Panaxaiki” agreed to receive 800m drachmas (2.4m Euro) each.  
 
Most owners of Greek football clubs can be characterised as opportunists. They spotted 
an undervalued sport asset and when ADS approached them they thought of exploiting it 
and make real TV money. Most of that money would be used to offset star players’ 
salaries. When the payers realised that more money was available and that they were 
considered as TV stars, not just football players, they naturally demanded higher wages. 
These demands were also voiced in other European countries. In fact, since 1999 the 
increase in wages of star players in the most popular European football clubs was 
increasing at a rate of between 15%-30% annually. In autumn 2001, just before Kirch and 
ITVdigital collapsed, players in Britain were threatening to go on strike if they did not 
have 5% share of broadcasting rights received by their clubs. In Greece, the majority of 
the clubs had already pledged a large sum of the new money to players in the form of 
increased wages. When they decided to move to ADS they were aware that they could 
not hold on to money from broadcasting rights forever. However, they had not 
anticipated how risky and short-lived the attempt would be. When the money did not 
appear due to ADS’s closure and its acquisition by Nova the clubs sought an emergency 
injection of funds from the government. Following government’s decline to assist fill the 
cash hole left by ADS’s demise, they were forced to re-negotiate deals with Nova. 
However, they are aware that they will never get the sums of money originally agreed 
with ADS. 
 
A lesson can perhaps be drawn that football clubs, especially in small or immature pay-
TV markets, should be cautious before deciding to sell their rights individually. Until 
relatively recently football broadcasting rights were owned and sold by the football 
league organisations on behalf of their members. Within the predominantly public service 
broadcasting systems of Europe this was deemed acceptable. However, the advent of 
competition among commercial free-to-air and pay-TV channels changed the sports 
rights market in two ways. First, it brought about higher prices for TV rights. Second, it 
led to appeals on behalf of clubs for greater freedom to negotiate individual deals in the 
sale of their games with TV channels. In fact, since end 1996 there has been a shift in TV 
rights ownership away from the leagues to the clubs. The traditional system of 
collectively owned and collectively sold rights has been under legal challenge across 
Europe. In the Netherlands in 1996 the Feyenoord football club took the Dutch league to 
court over the sale of TV rights. It basically wanted to be able to sell its own games. A 
year later in Spain Barcelona and Real Madrid challenged the right of the league to sell 
their games on a collective basis. Following similar challenges by other clubs in other 
countries sports rights are today being unbundled to the benefit of the big clubs.    
 
Clubs selling their own rights may seem an attractive proposition, particularly for the big 
clubs, but entails serious dangers as the Greek case demonstrated. On the contrary, a 
collective selling deal is safer and can benefit all clubs. In Britain, the 20 clubs competing 
in Premier League are committed to a collective selling deal. This, together with the 
relative strength of the British digital pay-TV market (37% of British households are 
DTV subscribers), has resulted in healthy competition for sports rights. In the October 
2000 deal, the Premiership matches were offered in three packages – live coverage of 66 
matches annually (bought by BSkyB for £1.1bn), highlight packages on Saturdays and 
Sunday night (bought by ITV for £183m) and pay-per-view (bought at the time by cable 
group NTL for £328m; later though NTL withdrew its bid). In Italy, where clubs sell 
their rights individually, negotiations do not benefit all clubs and in Germany, where pay-
TV market is not so healthy due to proliferation of free-to-air channels, the income of 
selling TV rights has dried up (see below).   
 
The Aftermath of ADS’s Closure 
 
The agreement between Nova and ADS means that only one DTV platform may survive 
in the market. Digital terrestrial TV is not considered a valid option, while digital cable 
TV is virtually non-existent as the current infrastructure is very limited. Still, it is 
doubtful whether Nova can flourish, even after remaining the sole player. The 
accumulated debt of Nova’s parent company NetMed is estimated at 300m Euros. This 
may affect its financial ability to acquire exclusive rights of premium programming. This 
may in turn prevent Nova from attracting 350-400,000 subscribers to be able to break-
even. Following the collapse of ADS, confidence of Greek viewers in DTV is currently 
very low. The DTV dream has thus suffered drawbacks for new entrepreneurs, who had 
invested a lot in a high-risk sector, for viewers, who had anticipated greater programming 
variety, and for football clubs alike, which had seen real chances to earn large sums of 
TV money.   
 
The European Experience 
 
The financial problems that most Greek clubs are facing due to ADS closure are not 
unique. Companies such as Kirch Media and ITVdigital had vastly overpaid for sports 
rights properties and their recent collapses should have sent warning signals to new DTV 
packages launched. New digital pay-TV schemes should have realised that it is difficult 
to generate sufficient returns to cover their initial investment. Football clubs should have 
realised that they should not become so dependent on income from a media contract. 
Income from selling broadcasting rights would decrease sooner or later. In fact, the 
potential for instability in the sports rights market became apparent in early 2001, when 
ISL/ISMM, a Swiss marketing and media agency went bankrupt. ISL/ISMM was the 
main commercial partner of Fifa, the world’s football governing body. There followed 
the insolvency of Kirch, which had acquired the broadcasting rights for the 2002 and 
2006 world cups by paying the astronomical fee $2.36bn. As a comparison, Fifa had sold 
the broadcasting rights for the 1998 world cup to the European Broadcasting Union, the 
body representing public broadcasters, for just $134m. The rise of broadcasting rights can 
be attributed to the liberalisation of the market, which allowed more channels and 
generated fierce competition between players with deep pockets. As is it known, revenues 
from the sale of world cup broadcasting rights were not enough to save the Kirch empire.   
 
The European experience shows that a number of DTV platforms either close down or 
merge with rivals in an attempt to overcome huge losses. As a result, agreements with 
football clubs are not honoured and often re-negotiated at a lower figure. The fact that the 
relationship between TV and football may not be so cosy as originally thought can be 
demonstrated by the following national experiences.            
 
In 1998 in Britain, the broadcasting companies Carlton and Granada created the 
terrestrial digital joint venture Ondigital, later renamed ITVdigital, to compete with 
Murdoch’s Sky Digital. After four years in operation, the digital terrestrial platform went 
into bankruptcy, owing mostly to overbidding for football rights. ITVdigital signed in 
2001 a three-year £315 million deal to show Nationwide League games. That was the 
largest broadcasting contract in the League’s history. The intention was to compete with 
BskyB, which had previously acquired the rights to show live Premiership matches for 
three years by putting down £1.1bn. The problem was that ITV attempted to copy Sky’s 
strategy by using less appealing football matches that were bound to attract fewer football 
funs. In fact, ITVdigital’s total number of subscribers by the time of its closure was only 
1.3 million, far behind Sky’s subscribers at 5.5 million at the time (now over 6 million). 
Another financial burden was that ITVdigital paid £60m annually to BSkyB for currying 
some of its channels, including Sky Sports, which shows most of Premier League 
matches. An additional problem was that the ITVdigital deal was signed before the 
company hit by a low take-up of services and mounting debts.  
 
In March 2002 the company went into administration and in mid-April warned that it 
could not afford to pay the remaining £178.5 million it owes the Football League. It 
finally closed down in end April 2002, leaving in ruins the 72 English football clubs that 
depended on it for much of their income. A solution offered by Murdoch’s BSkyB, which 
in July 2002 signed a four-year £95 million deal to show Nationwide League games. The 
deal though is much less lucrative than the original ITVdigital one and is not expected to 
benefit clubs substantially. To avoid administration some clubs, such as Watford, have 
already asked players to agree to a wage cut, whereas others sought to sell players to 
Premier League clubs. However, the softening of the transfer market has hampered clubs’ 
ability to raise funds by selling players. 
   
In Spain, the main digital satellite consortia Canal Satellite and Via Digital, controlled by 
pay-TV company Sogecable and national telecommunications group Telefonica 
respectively, announced in May 2002 that they were merging their digital satellite TV 
platforms in order to overcome financial losses. The announcement came one month after 
the collapse of a smaller digital terrestrial platform Quiero TV. The new merged DTV 
platform warned the football clubs competing in Primera Liga that they should expect to 
receive less money in future deals for televised sports rights than the 2002 deal at 180m 
Euros. In fact, the Spanish football clubs had anticipated the grey financial situation of 
DTV platforms and did not spend huge amounts of money to buy expensive players or 
substantially increase the wages of their existing stars. During 2002, the football clubs 
spent around 140m Euro in total for acquiring players (including Ronaldo’s move to Real 
Madrid from Italian Inter Milan at 45m Euro), whereas in 2001 they had spend more than 
300m Euro and in the year before that they had spent 450m Euro. 
 
In Germany, the collapse of Kirch Group had devastating consequences to the income of 
football clubs. The sole pay-TV operator Premiere World, which has acquired the 
exclusive rights to show Bundesliga matches to its 2.4m customers, is having a hard time 
to capitalise on DTV after the collapse of its parent company Kirch Media. Its difficult 
financial situation is reflected on the contract it has sighed with German football clubs. 
For the next three years, the clubs competing in Bundesliga, have agreed to receive 290m 
Euro, almost half of the original figure of 400m Euro.    
 
In Italy, the two competing digital satellite consortia Telepiu and Stream agreed to merge 
in June 2002 in order to overcome huge losses. Losses at Telepiu, the Italian pay-TV 
subsidiary of Canal Plus, controlled by Vivendi Universal, had long been running at 
around 1m Euro per day owing mostly to the high costs of TV football rights. Following 
several months of negotiation, Rupert Murdoch’s Stream actually bought the rival 
platform Telepiu for 893m Euro in early October 2002. Since there will be no 
competition for football match rights, it is expected that Rupert Murdoch will be in a 
position to re-negotiate contracts signed with Italy’s leading clubs, as part of the 
restructuring to reverse losses. But there are already signs that the flood of TV money 
coming into football is falling. During 2001 in Serie A TV payments reached 480m 
Euros, while in 2002 that amount fell to 400m Euros.   
 
In France, football clubs also face the prospect of receiving less money from selling their 
TV rights. In 1999, and following the winning of the 1998 World Football Cup by the 
French national team, football clubs managed to sign a contract of 275m Euro with 
digital pay-TV channel Canal Plus in a five-year deal. They also succeeded in getting 
extra 100m Euro by signing deals with digital satellite platform TPS (which competes 
with Canal Plus) and pan-European channel Eurosport. The clubs have been warned that 
they should be prepared for thinner contracts when the current deal with Canal Plus 
comes to an end in 2004. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Undoubtedly football is the world’s most popular sport event with a global appeal. It can 
catch the imagination of hundreds of thousands of spectators and is good at forging bonds 
between people. Television has helped greatly to broaden the awesome global appeal of 
football. As the 2002 world football cup showed, TV viewers all over the globe with 
different cultures, educational backgrounds and beliefs all enjoyed live action and shared 
the same scenes. However, the close liaison between TV and football has suffered 
tensions. Recent experience shows that the football game may have entered a period of 
severe financial turbulence due to its over-dependence on TV revenues. There is little 
doubt that the sports rights market is in trouble. Football cannot any more command top 
prices as it had done in the recent past.   
 
 
